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Abstract 
This paper argues that international environmental law (IEL) is not sufficiently ambitious to 
confront the Anthropocene’s socio-ecological crisis. The paper specifically focuses on IEL’s 
lack of ambitious but “unmentionable” ecological norms such as rights of nature, Earth system 
integrity, and ecological sustainability that are not yet considered to be part of the corpus of 
IEL, but that arguably should be. Assuming that the recent Global Pact for the Environment 
initiative and its accompanying United Nations-mandated report that assesses possible gaps in 
IEL are indicative of the type of reforms we might expect of IEL in future, the paper then 
determines if and the extent to which these embrace ambitious norms and address IEL’s 
“unmentionable” ecological normative gaps. A secondary, but related, objective of the paper 
is to briefly respond to the emerging view that any radical critique of the Global Pact initiative 
is either unfounded, unwarranted or undesirable.  
 
1. Introduction 
Aside from an increasingly marginalized group of eco-crisis sceptics,1 few would disagree that 
we live in unprecedented times of socio-ecological upheaval. Unnecessary to reproduce here, 
the daily news, social media, and academic literature are replete with references to, and detailed 
popular and scientific accounts of, the massive socio-ecological harms and their attendant 
injustices that are being committed in the name of selective, globally uneven, human 
“progress” and “development”. We see this clearly through the lens of the Anthropocene, 
which is thought (not uncontroversially),2 to be the current geological epoch where some 
privileged humans have become an Earth system altering geological force.3 After having spent 
a good part of five years examining the juridical dimensions of the Anthropocene and the 
                                               
* Research Professor of Law, North-West University, South Africa; Marie Curie Research Fellow, University of 
Lincoln, United Kingdom. Research for this paper was supported by the author’s European Commission Marie 
Sklodowska Curie project titled: “Global Ecological Custodianship: Innovative International Environmental Law 
for the Anthropocene” (GLEC-LAW) under grant agreement No. 751782 and it was completed in May 2019. My 
sincere thanks to Sam Adelman, Duncan French and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.  
1 See for a brief discussion, Andrew Hoffman “The Culture and Discourse of Climate Skepticism” 9(1) 2011 
Strategic Organization 77-84.  
2 Frank Biermann and Eva Lövbrand “Encountering the ‘Anthropocene’: Setting the Scene” in Frank Biermann 
and Eva Lövbrand (eds) Anthropocene Encounters: New Directions in Green Political Thinking (Cambridge 
University Press, 2019) 1-22; A Malm and A Hornborg “The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the 
Anthropocene Narrative” 2014(1) The Anthropocene Review 62–69.  
3 Jan Zalasiewicz et al “The Working Group on the Anthropocene: Summary of Evidence and Interim 
Recommendations” 2017(19) Anthropocene 55-60.  
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normative implications of this trope,4 I am confident to suggest that it provides a useful 
framework to critically interrogate law, and specifically international environmental law (IEL), 
as a central component of the various “human systems … that are a past cause, present 
consequence, and future adaptation of our ecosystem changes”.5  
Looking through the Anthropocene’s lens, a vast body of critical legal scholarship now reveals 
the truth about IEL and its entanglement with, and structural complicity in, sustaining multiple 
drivers of Earth system destruction and socio-ecological injustices.6 These include IEL’s 
support of several foundational paradigms that underlie global economic, political, legal and 
social human systems such as: anthropocentric sustainable development, (neo)colonialism, 
property rights, state sovereignty, and perhaps most troubling of them all, neoliberal corporate 
exploitation. Critical legal scholarship has shown how IEL (mostly implicitly, but often also 
explicitly) structurally contributes to causing, sustaining and exacerbating these predatory 
paradigms that, in turn, result in Earth system destruction, exploitation and the oppression of 
vulnerable humans and the non-human world.7  
Troubling as these are, I want to pause for a moment and focus on one related issue that I 
believe demands urgent critical reflection; namely IEL’s lack of normative ambition. My thesis 
is straightforward: IEL is not sufficiently ambitious to deal with the increasingly assertive and 
destructive Anthropos (understood here to refer to a small and particularized, but powerful and 
privileged, subset of the past and present global human population),8 and with the myriad socio-
ecological injustices arising from such human domination of the Earth system and of the 
vulnerable living order. I do not believe there is, nor that there should be, any question as to 
whether IEL must provide for ambitious norms. It must, if it wants to retain its legitimacy and 
raison d’etre as the primary juridical collection of global environmental protection measures, 
and if it intends to remain relevant in the face of a changing Earth system. After all, the 
relevance, purpose and effectiveness of IEL as part of global environmental governance is now 
increasingly under scrutiny amidst growing public resistance to a business-as-usual approach, 
evidenced in particular by the “Fridays for Future” climate protests occurring all around the 
globe, the steady rise of climate litigation, and the surge in support for green political parties 
during the recent European Commission elections.9 I believe the only questions that remain as 
far as IEL’s normative ambition is concerned, at least for now, are: i) how could its level of 
normative ambition be raised; and ii) which specific ambitious norms must be developed and 
embraced by IEL? Assuming that it is an issue that is sufficiently critical to be taken up more 
                                               
4 See, among others, Louis Kotzé “Rethinking Global Environmental Law and Governance in the Anthropocene” 
2014(32) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 121-156. 
5 Andrew Hoffman and P. Devereaux Jennings Re-engaging with Sustainability in the Anthropocene Era 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018) 5.  
6 See, for example, Anna Grear “Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on ‘Anthropocentric’ 
Law and Anthropocene ‘Humanity’” 2015(26) Law Critique 225-249; Louis Kotzé (ed) Environmental Law and 
Governance for the Anthropocene (Hart, 2017). 
7 Sam Adelman “The Sustainable Development Goals, Anthropocentrism and Neoliberalism” in Duncan French 
and Louis Kotzé (eds) Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation (Edward Elgar, 2018) 
15-40; Jorge Viñuales “The Organisation of the Anthropocene in our Hands?” 2018 1(1) International Legal 
Theory and Practice 1-81.  
8 The Anthropocene’s human, or Anthropos, is most accurately characterised as being representative of only a 
small part of the past and present global population that entrenches their dominance and privilege through a 




understanding-how-they-work; William Burns and Hari Osofsky (eds) Adjudicating Climate Change: State, 
National, and International Approaches (Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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thoroughly in future discussions, in this paper I want to initiate a debate about IEL’s normative 
ambition by broadly reflecting on each of these two questions.  
I do so in Part 2 by exploring the notion of normative ambition and then by situating the 
question of normative ambition specifically in the context of IEL. The several ways in, and 
extent to which, IEL must be ambitious are widely open to interpretation. Its normative 
ambition could relate to its legal character (binding or non-binding norms), the parties it applies 
to (State and non-State), its geographical reach, measures for compliance and enforcement, its 
domestic impact, environmental governance resources and institutions tasked with its 
implementation, the political will to implement IEL, and finally, the substance of its norms.10 
I focus for present purposes only on its substance and specifically the extent to which IEL must 
entrench ambitious ecological norms to address its “unmentionable gaps”.11 These 
“unmentionable gaps” relate to those norms that have not yet been agreed by the international 
community. In fact, their adoption has been actively resisted by States who continue to claim 
exceptionalism and the protection of state sovereignty in efforts to avoid ecological 
commitments. These norms are instead more aspirational and certainly radical in nature, 
reflecting a genesis that originates instead from other sources: jurisprudence, philosophical and 
ethical approaches to environmental care, alternatives to the mainstream, religious doctrine, or 
simply new ideas. These are the “unmentionable gaps” as they are not yet, or not ordinarily, 
part of the mainstream (international law) discourse – or, if included, invariably in a preambular 
manner. Some examples are the rights of nature, Earth system integrity, the principle of in 
dubio pro natura and the ecological rule of law; all of which have the potential to push for a 
radically different and more ambitious normative framework to address the systemic 
challenges inherent in IEL and in global environmental governance by increasing the normative 
reach, power and impact of norms that must ultimately seek to counter the socio‐economic–
political–juridical system's exploitation of the Earth system.  
For the sake of context, in Part 3 I pause for a moment to briefly describe two earlier initiatives 
that could have addressed IEL’s lack of normative ambition and that could have responded to 
its “unmentionable gaps”, but ultimately did not. These are the World Charter for Nature of 
1982 and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Draft International 
Covenant on Environment and Development of 2010 (IUCN Draft Covenant).  
Building on two earlier critiques,12 in Part 4, I then examine the most recent and ongoing 
attempt to reform IEL, namely, the Global Pact for the Environment (Global Pact) initiative 
and its recently published United Nations (UN) Secretary-General report that identifies gaps in 
IEL.13 Assuming that the draft text of the Pact and its gap report are at least vaguely indicative 
                                               
10 I have identified these based on a list of possible gaps in IEL that Biniaz has recently formulated. Susan Biniaz 
“The UNGA Resolution on a ‘Global Pact for the Environment’: A Chance to Put the Horse before the Cart” 
2019(28) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 33-39 at 35.  
11 Duncan French and Louis Kotzé “’Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’: International Environmental 
Law’s Factual, Technical and (Unmentionable) Normative Gaps” 2019(28) Review of European, Comparative 
and International Environmental Law 25-32.  
12 Louis Kotzé and Duncan French “A Critique of the Global Pact for the Environment: A Stillborn Initiative or 
the Foundation for Lex Anthropocenae?” 2018(18) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics 811; Duncan French and Louis Kotzé “’Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’: International 
Environmental Law’s Factual, Technical and (Unmentionable) Normative Gaps” 2019(28) Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law 25-32.  
13 UNGA, ‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ UN Doc A/RES/72/277 (10 May 2018); UNGA, “Gaps 
in International Environmental Law and Environment-related Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the 
Environment”, UN Doc A/73/419 (30 November 2018). See for a general discussion, P Thieffrey “The Proposed 
Global Pact for the Environment and European Law” 2018(27) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 
 4 
of where future reform processes might go, and if the Global Pact initiative is in fact the 
“constitutional moment” that must reform IEL, as it is thought to be,14 then it is reasonable to 
expect that the draft Global Pact and its gap report will also have to embrace normative 
ambition as a core rationale, guiding narrative and objective. Much has been written on the 
Global Pact,15 and in this paper I only seek to determine the extent to which the draft Global 
Pact and its gap report recognise, and are accommodative of the need for, increasing IEL’s 
normative ambition by embracing “unmentionable” norms. A secondary, but intimately related 
objective of the paper, is to briefly respond to the recent view that any radical critique of the 
Global Pact initiative is either unfounded, unwarranted or undesirable.16  
 
2. IEL’s normative ambition?  
In a general sense, meaning the opposite of “modest”, the word “ambitious” or “ambition” does 
not merely suggest an effort to somehow raise the bar or to progressively strive for 
improvement. It very specifically also imparts the idea of a deliberate and more immediate 
pursuit of achievement; a “strong desire and determination to succeed”, which is “intended to 
satisfy high aspirations and [is] therefore difficult to achieve”.17 Not something that comes 
easily then, or even automatically, ambition is instead associated with being “determined, 
forceful, pushy, enterprising, pioneering, progressive, eager, motivated, driven, enthusiastic, 
energetic, zealous, committed”,18 and so forth. An ambitious norm is therefore a norm that is 
quite extraordinary in terms of its scope, substance, extent of obligations, and the level of 
achievement it aspires to. It is result-driven and determined to achieve results. It will allow no 
exceptions and will not apply selectively if this means that it might fail. Moreover, the creation 
of an ambitious norm, because it is radical and possibly very different from what exists, might 
very well be resisted because of the possibility that such a norm could upset the status quo.  
How is all of this relevant for IEL? There seems to be general agreement that IEL has achieved 
many victories since its birth in the early 1970s. But there are likewise many valid views 
suggesting that IEL has not been able to confront head on the ever-deepening socio-ecological 
crisis that is engulfing the living order. Some of the main concerns revolve on issues related 
to, among many others: state exceptionalism and voluntarism; IEL’s fragmented, problem-
shifting approach; IEL’s inability to counter the dominant neoliberal growth-without-limits 
development paradigm; IEL’s exclusive human focus; IEL’s lack of normative hierarchy; and 
IEL’s inability to govern a broader set of actors in addition to the state, such as corporations, 
that are causing massive socio-ecological destruction.19 Commentators have suggested ways 
to address these concerns and to reform IEL including, for example: proposals to “ecologize” 
                                               
182; J Raith “The ‘Global Pact for the environment’: A new instrument to protect the planet?” 2018 15(1) Journal 
for European Environmental and Planning Law 3–23. 
14 Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales “A Global Pact for the Environment: Conceptual Foundations” 2019(28) 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3-12.  
15 See, for example, Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales (eds) A Global Pact for the Environment: Legal Foundations 
(Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Governance, Report 2019-1). Available at 
https://www.ceenrg.landecon.cam.ac.uk/report-
files/AguilaVinualesAGlobalPactfortheEnvironmentCambridgeReportMarch2019.pdf.  
16 Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales “A Global Pact for the Environment: Conceptual Foundations” 2019(28) 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3-12.  
17 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ambitious.  
18 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ambitious. 
19 Louis Kotzé “International Environmental Law and the Anthropocene’s Energy Dilemma” (To appear in 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 2019-copy available on request from author). 
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IEL with the adoption of rights of nature and of the principle in dubio pro natura;20 to develop 
peremptory global environmental “constitutional” norms or even a global environmental 
constitution;21 to adopt a global right to a healthy environment;22 to replace the principle of 
sustainable development with that of ecological sustainability;23 and to develop an all-
embracing and elevated framework IEL instrument (or a Grundnorm) in the form of the 
principle of ecological integrity to facilitate coherence in global environmental governance.24 
Although they might not have been explicitly framed as such,25 these concerns and reform 
proposals essentially all express the need for IEL to raise its level of ambition by embracing 
radical “unmentionable” norms. 
IEL’s unambitious norms are entangled with, and structurally complicit in promoting, the 
predatory paradigms that underlie human systems to the extent that States as the explicit 
architects of IEL, and their corporate stakeholders which increasingly function as “private 
sector quasi-states”,26 would want to avoid (as they currently do) adopting the type of 
ambitious ecological norms that could disrupt their relentless pursuit of neoliberal economic 
development. In other words, one major reason behind IEL’s unambitious normative nature is 
because IEL’s creators deliberately want IEL to be unambitious with a view to promoting their 
own deeply embedded selective privilege in the short term. To this end, IEL is used to 
perpetuate some of the deep structural drivers that are causing the Anthropocene.27 I provide 
only three examples in this respect.  
                                               
20 Nicholas Bryner “Applying the Principle in Dubio Pro Natura for Enforcement of Environmental Law” in 
Organization of American States Inter-American Congress on the Rule of Law: Selected Essays (2015) 166-173. 
21 Louis Kotzé Global Environmental Constitutionalism in the Anthropocene (Hart, 2016). 
22 UN Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating 
to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment (24 January 2018) (A/HRC/37/59). Par 
46; Louis Kotzé “In Search of a Right to a Healthy Environment in International Law” in John Knox and Ramin 
Pejan (eds) The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 136-154. Although 
this is restricted to a specific region, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently underscored the 
significance of developing a global right to a healthy environment in its advisory opinion “Environment and 
Human Rights” OC-23/17. See,  
https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2019/advisory-opinion-oc-2317.  
23 Klaus Bosselmann The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance 2nd ed (Routledge, 
2016). 
24 Rakhyun Kim and Klaus Bosselmann “International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene: Towards a 
Purposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements” 2013 2(2) Transnational Environmental Law 285-
309.  
25 A simple Google Scholar search revealed only 55 publications containing the combined phrases “environmental 
law” and “normative ambition”; while I was unable to find any publication dealing explicitly and specifically with 
IEL’s normative ambition in any comprehensive way. I suspect that had the foregoing critique of IEL been 
grouped under the single, conceptually and thematically coherent banner of “normative ambition” that could have 
been collectively pursued, (very much in the same way that “compliance and enforcement” acts as another such 
a banner) it might have had a more decisive impact on the discourse, and perhaps even on practice. 
26 Anna Grear “Towards ‘Climate Justice’? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: 
Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy” 2014(5) Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 103-133 at 108. Emphasis in the original. Departing from Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality, Hursh and Henderson argue that the notion of the state must be reconceptualized in the current 
globalized neoliberal order: “the state is no longer limited to the elected government but includes all those who 
‘attempt to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of our behavior according to particular sets of norms 
and for a variety of ends’”. This would then include corporations. David Hursh and Joseph Henderson “Contesting 
Global Neoliberalism and Creating Alternative Futures” 2011 32(2) Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of 
Education 171-185 at 177.  
27 See, for a comprehensive account, Jorge Viñuales “The Organisation of the Anthropocene in our Hands?” 2018 
1(1) International Legal Theory and Practice 1-81.  
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First, ambitious climate laws are seen to inhibit economic growth. The current global climate 
law regime is as weak as it is for this very reason, while some of the more ambitious, and 
certainly innovative, law-making occurs in the areas of global investment law in an effort to 
stimulate global economic growth. The zeal with which States and their corporations have 
pursued the creation of the powerful Bretton Woods institutions and the influential World 
Trade Organization and their accompanying legal regimes on the one hand,28 while they remain 
reluctant to create an equally powerful global environmental authority on the other hand (the 
United Nations Environment Programme still does not have more powerful UN “organization” 
status),29 is a case in point. On balance, global normative ambition seems to remain confined 
to projects that promote the kind of neoliberal economic development that structurally 
exacerbates the drivers of the Anthropocene; not the other way around. 
Second, States have deliberately ensured that anthropocentric sustainable development is the 
cornerstone principle of IEL. But as deceptively simple and environmentally oriented an idea 
as sustainable development seems to be, it is not a socio-ecologically friendly process.30 
Critical legal scholars have shown that it is rather a convenient, fictitious ideological palliative 
that IEL underwrites and that legitimizes and helps rationalize anthropocentric Earth system 
altering practices.31 Other principles of IEL such as the polluter pays, prevention, and 
precautionary principles are more explicitly focused on achieving environmental protection 
results. But while they are usually invoked in the same breath as sustainable development, they 
have been unable to counter the type of socio-ecological destruction that sustainable 
development itself perpetuates. Moreover, while they have metamorphosed over the years, 
these principles have been designed decades ago at a time when the socio-ecological crisis was 
not appreciated as being all that severe, and when innovative regulatory options were more 
limited than they are today.32 They have neither kept up with progressive innovations in Earth 
system science, such as the emergence of resilience thinking, an Earth system law and 
governance approach, planetary boundaries and the adaptive governance of complex systems; 
nor can they mirror domestic juridical innovations such as the principle of in dubio pro 
natura.33 As we will see with the Global Pact process below, many of the discussions around 
these principles continue to focus not on how to raise their level of ambition, or on creating 
more effective principles to bolster these, but rather on what their legal status is and how they 
could be consolidated (itself of course not an unimportant debate, but one that would seem to 
crowd out other critical deliberations). 
                                               
28 Anna Grear “Towards ‘Climate Justice’? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: 
Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy” 2014(5) Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 103-133.  
29 Frank Biermann and Steffen Bauer (eds) A World Environment Organization: Solution or Threat for Effective 
International Environmental Governance? (Ashgate, 2005).  
30 Sam Adelman “The Sustainable Development Goals, Anthropocentrism and Neoliberalism” in Duncan French 
and Louis Kotzé (eds) Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation (Edward Elgar, 2018) 
15-40 at 21.  
31 Benjamin Richardson “A Damp Squib: Environmental Law from a Human Evolutionary Perspective” Osgoode 
Hall Law School Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy Paper Series 2011 7(3) 1 at 31; Sam 
Adelman “Epistemologies of Mastery” in Anna Grear and Louis Kotzé (eds) Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015) 9-27.  
32 Cameron Jefferies, Sara Seck and Tim Stephens “International Law, Innovation, and Environmental Change in 
the Anthropocene” in Neil Craik, Cameron Jefferies, Sara Seck and Tim Stephens (eds) Global Environmental 
Change and Innovation in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 1-17.  
33 Louis Kotzé and Rakhyun Kim “Earth System Law: The Juridical Dimensions of Earth System Governance” 
2019 1(1) Earth System Governance 1-12.  
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And third, IEL still consciously pursues voluntarism when it comes to corporate responsibility. 
It is failing as a result to reign in corporate exploitation and in creating stringent standards to 
regulate the many eco-destructive activities of corporations. IEL has failed in this latter respect 
because States deliberately want it to fail: the corporation after all remains the State’s most 
agile, lucrative, profitable and influential agent of sustainable development, as it were. These 
“guardians of the neoliberal global order”, as Grear says, “which many … see as being the 
guardians of a global economic elite- are committed, it seems, to an ideology with 
demonstrably destructive social and environmental impacts, and a profoundly intensifying 
effect on the unevenness of the legal order.”34 Proposals for IEL to hold corporations directly 
accountable for causing global climate change would certainly be frowned upon and swept 
under the rug together with other “unmentionable” norms.  
The foregoing are only some examples of IEL’s normative “modesty”, or its lack of normative 
ambition. At best, the current set of climate laws, principles of IEL, and corporate 
environmental norms can be described as being the opposite of ambitious, i.e., “moderate, fair, 
tolerable, passable, adequate, satisfactory, acceptable, unexceptional”,35 and at worst as being 
non-existent and unacceptable. Ambitious IEL norms then would be those norms that are 
exactly the opposite of what we currently have. These are the “unmentionable” norms that 
recognise and set as juridical threshold the finiteness and fragility of the Earth’s entire life 
support system and that embrace Earth system integrity as a Grundnorm;36 norms that 
recognise the “symbiotic generativity of life”37 or inter-speciesism aimed at ensuring inter- and 
intra-species justice in an inter- and intra-generational sense; norms that address profound 
patterns of global unevenness and differentially distributed human and non-human 
vulnerabilities; and norms that restrict the principal actors, such as corporations, that drive 
neoliberal economic development at the cost of Earth system integrity.38  
 
3. (A brief interlude) 
I have noted above one major concern that keeps complicating efforts to raise the level of IEL’s 
normative ambition: ambitious environmental protection norms are seen (quite rightly so 
because this is after all their raison d’etre), to restrict the short term-focused, neoliberal, 
capitalist, growth-without-limits agenda. Any effort to raise the level of IEL’s normative 
ambition could thus be expected to be met with significant resistance from those actors that 
have vested interests in perpetuating this agenda. Moreover, it would probably take a carefully 
coordinated effort to muster global State support for instigating any radical change of the IEL 
order. 
                                               
34 Anna Grear “Towards ‘Climate Justice’? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: 
Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy” 2014(5) Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 103-133 at 107. Emphasis in the original.  
35 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/modest.  
36 Rakhyun Kim and Klaus Bosselmann “International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene: Towards a 
Purposive System of Multilateral Environmental Agreements” 2013 2(2) Transnational Environmental Law 285-
309.  
37 Anna Grear “‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene’: Re-encountering Environmental Law and its 
‘Subject’ with Haraway and New Materialism” in Louis Kotzé (ed) Environmental Law and Governance for the 
Anthropocene (Hart, 2017) 91. 
38 Louis Kotzé “The Anthropocene, Earth System Vulnerability and Socio-ecological Injustice in an Age of 
Human Rights” 2019 10(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 62-85.  
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The Global Pact initiative is not the first global effort with such ambitions. In 1982 a large 
majority of UNGA Member States did seem willing to take the road less travelled with their 
almost universal endorsement of the World Charter for Nature.39 The World Charter for Nature 
is a blend between a juridical and ethical instrument, but in both contexts an “avowedly 
ecological instrument, which emphasises the protection of nature as an end in itself”.40 As I 
have argued elsewhere,41 this is an agreement that could have raised the level of IEL’s 
normative ambition through its “principles of conservation by which all human conduct 
affecting nature is to be guided and judged.”42 The World Charter for Nature raises the bar to 
the extent that it hints at “unmentionable” norms, including for example: “life depends on the 
uninterrupted functioning of natural systems”; “living in harmony with nature” is critical; and 
“Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man”.43 Moreover, 
“Ecosystems and organisms … shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable 
productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or 
species with which they coexist.”44  
The World Charter has, however, all but disappeared from collective consciousness and it has 
not featured prominently in or exerted any obvious norm-shaping influence on the development 
of IEL. Instead, all subsequent global environmental conferences pointedly retreated from the 
deep ecological and ambitious principles of the Charter,45 and States continue down the 
unambitious “sustainable development” path, which they fully endorsed at subsequent global 
conferences (such as the UN Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 and the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002), and through grand development visions 
such as Our Common Future of 1987, the Millennium Development Goals, and more recently, 
the Sustainable Development Goals.46 
Another reform initiative was the IUCN Draft Covenant, which was mean to be, “an 
authoritative reference and checklist for legislators, civil servants and other stakeholders 
worldwide in their endeavours to ensure that principles and rules of international environmental 
law and development are thoroughly addressed when they are drafting new, or updating 
existing, policies and laws”.47 Useful as this is, the Covenant instead more clearly serves the 
role of an unenforceable generic checklist that could guide the consolidation of existing IEL 
norms (also a principal objective of the Global Pact initiative as we shall see below). Not 
endorsed by the UNGA, while the Covenant does contain some ecological provisions that 
might be considered more ambitious,48 it mostly restates trite principles such as prevention and 
                                               
39 UNGA Resolution A/RES/37/7, of 28 October 1982, on World Charter for Nature. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm.  
40 Philippe Sands and Jaqueline Peel Principles of International Environmental Law 3rd ed (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 37.  
41 Louis Kotzé “A Global Environmental Constitution for the Anthropocene?” 2019 8(1) Transnational 
Environmental Law 11-33. 
42 Preamble.  
43 Preamble.  
44 Article 4. 
45 Bill Devall “The Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: 1960-2000 - A Review” 2001 6(1) Ethics and the 
Environment 18-41 at 30.  
46 Sam Adelman “Sustainable Development Goals, Anthropocentrism and Neoliberalism” in Duncan French and 
Louis Kotzé (eds) Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation (Edward Elgar, 2018) 15-
40; Louis Kotzé “The Sustainable Development Goals: An Existential Critique Alongside Three New-millennial 
Analytical Paradigms” in Duncan French and Louis Kotzé (eds) Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory 
and Implementation (Edward Elgar, 2018) 41-65.  
47 IUCN Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development 4th ed (IUCN, Gland, 2010) xi.  
48 See, for example some statements in the preamble, article 2 (respect for all life forms) and article 9 (resilience).  
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precaution,49 bolsters anthropocentric juridical claims such as the right to development,50 and 
reinforces claims to “sustainable development”.51  
 
4. The Global Pact initiative 
The most recent (and still ongoing) initiative to reform IEL, is the Global Pact that was initially 
presented to the world in June 2017 by French think tank, Le Club de Juristes, which also 
coordinated its drafting process.52 The Pact was drafted by a Group of Experts; a network of 
over 100 lawyers representing almost 40 nationalities and chaired by Laurent Fabius, the 
president of Climate Change COP21, the current President of the French Constitutional 
Council, and recently appointed UN Environment Patron on Environmental Governance. The 
Pact’s objectives seem to be three-pronged and to be something of a blend between the World 
Charter for Nature and the IUCN Draft Covenant, namely: to be a globally binding 
environmental law instrument; to thus entrench all major principles of IEL in one document 
(elsewhere described as a “broader common core of legally binding principles on which 
significant gaps in the regulation could rely upon”53); whilst also developing progressively the 
law to provide a globally recognised right to live in an ecologically sound environment, with 
associated procedural environmental rights.54 In terms of these objectives, the ambition of the 
Global Pact presumably lies in its pursuit to be the first binding framework instrument of IEL; 
in its vision to codify environmental principles; and in its pursuit to be the first global 
instrument that entrenches higher order global environmental constitutional norms in the form 
of rights. It therefore clearly wants to be ambitious. If it actually succeeds is an altogether 
different matter which I reflect on below.  
On 19 September 2017 France convened a “launch summit” as a side event to the high-level 
segment of the 72nd session of the UNGA which led nations to bring forward a draft resolution 
on the Global Pact to the UNGA. On 10 May 2018, the resolution was adopted by a majority 
of UNGA Member States.55 In particular, the resolution established an ad hoc open-ended 
working group to consider the matter of the Global Pact, and in particular to be guided by a 
“technical and evidence-based” report from the UN Secretary-General on “possible gaps in 
international environmental law and environment-related instruments”.56 Published in late 
2018,57 this report is currently being considered by the ad hoc working group established under 
the resolution, to “discuss possible options to address possible gaps … and, if deemed 
                                               
49 Articles 6 and 7.  
50 Article 10.  
51 Article 1.  
52 As a draft text adopted by a broad consultative process, its present status and an authoritative source for its 
existence is difficult to formalise into traditional citation. I used the text available at: 
http://pactenvironment.emediaweb.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Global-Pact-for-the-Environment-project-24-
June-2017.pdf.  
53 Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales “A Global Pact for the Environment: Conceptual Foundations” 2019(28) 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3-12 at 5.  
54 https://globalpactenvironment.org/en/the-pact/objectives/.  
55 143 votes in favour, 6 against and 6 abstentions. The States voting against were Iran, Philippines, Russia 
Federation, Syria, Turkey, and the United States; whilst the States abstaining were Belarus, Malaysia, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Tajikistan. UNGA, ‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ UN Doc 
A/RES/72/277 (10 May 2018). 
56 UNGA, ‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ UN Doc A/RES/72/277 (10 May 2018) paras 1 and 2.  
57 UNGA, “Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-related Instruments: Towards a Global 
Pact for the Environment”, UN Doc A/73/419 (30 November 2018).  
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necessary, the scope, parameters and feasibility of an international instrument”.58 The gap 
report is appropriate and it could possibly be very useful, even though it should arguably have 
preceded and informed the content of the draft Global Pact; not the other way round. Biniaz 
suggests in this regard that: “[A]s a matter of process, it was disturbing that the proposal [of 
the Global Pact] set out a solution – that is, a new, overarching agreement with broad, legally 
binding principles – without a persuasive case that such an instrument bore any relationship to 
real‐world environmental problems. The proposed Global Pact seemed to be a solution in 
search of a problem, rather than in response to one.”59 
It is impossible to know, or even to predict at this stage, what the outcome of the foregoing 
deliberative process might be. There are several possible scenarios, ranging from the ad hoc 
working group suggesting to do nothing at all and to maintain the status quo; to a “middle way” 
option that continues the process of identifying gaps and to further investigate ways to address 
these gaps in incremental stages; through to what could be the most “drastic” option, namely 
to adopt, as soon as possible, a globally binding instrument to address the gaps in IEL. Focusing 
for present purposes only on the latter, such a binding global instrument might or might not 
contain the type of ambitious norms that are required, depending on what the working group 
advises, and ultimately of course, on what the architects of IEL believe must be included in 
such a document. But again, this remains mere speculation which leaves us neither here nor 
there. It is therefore more useful at this stage in the process to determine whether the draft 
Global Pact and its gap report consider the need to pursue normative ambition as being 
important, and if they do, the extent to which they embrace the type of extraordinary and 
unconventional norms that must respond to IEL’s “unmentionable” gaps.  
As a prelude to such a determination, I am well aware of the view maintaining that a critique 
of the Global Pact in its draft form is premature, and therefore unfounded. Aguila and Viñuales 
say “the draft project is, in many ways, a ‘proof of concept’ developed to lend credibility to the 
larger enterprise of launching negotiations to conclude a [Global Pact]”.60 Without referring to 
anyone specifically, they believe that “much of the criticism that the initiative has faced, 
including from overtly hostile quarters … rely on … details of formulation in the draft project 
which will very likely change in the course of the negotiations, without undermining the overall 
idea.”61 Such a perception of “hostility” might perhaps be understandable at some level, 
although it is unfortunate that well-meaning and ultimately radical scholarly critique is 
mistaken for something that it is not. The severity of critique in this context has always only 
been determined by the need to convey a sense of urgency to encourage using the Global Pact 
initiative as effectively as possible, and as a potentially radically different and powerful 
response to the Anthropocene’s socio-ecological challenges. If there is any perceived 
“hostility” towards the Global Pact project, it is solely aimed at cautioning against the pitfalls 
of a business-as-usual approach. Biniaz has equally made it patently clear that critiquing and 
challenging the draft Global Pact and its process does not imply that one is “against the 
                                               
58 UNGA, ‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ UN Doc A/RES/72/277 (10 May 2018) para 2. 
59 Susan Biniaz “The UNGA Resolution on a ‘Global Pact for the Environment’: A Chance to Put the Horse before 
the Cart” 2019(28) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 33-39 at 34.  
60 Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales “A Global Pact for the Environment: Conceptual Foundations” 2019(28) 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3-12 at 9.  
61 Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales “A Global Pact for the Environment: Conceptual Foundations” 2019(28) 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3-12 at 9. 
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environment”, 62 or that one seeks to actively undermine the laudable agenda for change that 
the Global Pact initiative pursues. On the contrary.  
I maintain the view that a critical, possibly even radical, approach to critiquing the process, 
content and objectives of the Global Pact in all stages of its development (from its draft, through 
to its gaps analysis, negotiation and possible adoption) remains valuable, even though such 
critique might be frowned upon. Complacency and timidity, after all, have rarely led to deep 
structural changes of society and of its social systems, including of the law. If we agree about 
everything, nothing changes. It is when people become “hostile” that human rights are adopted 
as key components of the post-world War legal order, that oppressive apartheid regimes fall, 
that women are allowed to vote, and that same sex couples are allowed to marry. Equally, the 
Anthropocene’s socio-ecological crisis asks everything but being timid or complacent, 
especially from scholars:  
An important role of legal scholarship is to question the prevailing conventions of legal 
thought and practice, including the traditional legal forms of accepted institutions. The legal 
forms of environmental protection should not be immune from the scrutiny of radical legal 
scholarship, a scholarship which reexamines prevailing principles, laws, and legal regimes.63 
In pursuit of such radical critique then, in the same way that there is considerable value in 
critiquing a draft bill serving before parliament that often looks very different from the final 
statute, notably to the extent that such critique could make a constructive contribution to 
improving the final statute, there is undeniably value in continuing a critique of the Global Pact, 
especially in its draft form.  
Such an early determination of the extent to which the Pact pursues normative ambition is 
further important because the draft text of the Global Pact (either in its present or amended 
form) could possibly be the blueprint from which States launch their ensuing deliberations; 
informed as such deliberations will likely also be by the accompanying gap report and the 
recommendations of the ad hoc working group. This remains at least a possibility despite the 
valid alternative view that the Global Pact initiative “never expected for the draft project to be 
adopted as such, or even in a mildly revised form. The text proposed is above all representative 
of an approach, which may change significantly, even fundamentally during the 
negotiations.”64 A real possibility indeed, but states might also very well adopt the draft text 
on the back of recommendations of the ad hoc working group as its point of departure, 
regardless of the initial intentions of its drafters. It will therefore be critical for the Global Pact 
initiative to already embrace normative ambition and to lay the foundations for the creation of 
ambitions IEL norms because the reality is that intergovernmental negotiations usually water 
down the starting document rather than increasing its normative strength, or viscosity. An 
undesirable scenario that must be avoided as far as possible, such negotiations often “mainly 
involve political compromises and decision making by consensus, and more often than not 
result in low or lowest common denominator outcomes. This could lead to a regression towards 
                                               
62 Susan Biniaz “The UNGA Resolution on a ‘Global Pact for the Environment’: A Chance to Put the Horse 
before the Cart” 2019(28) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 33-39 at 34.  
63 Richard Brooks “A New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law” 1991(6) Journal of Environmental Law and 
Litigation 1-38 at 1.  
64 Yann Aguila and Jorge Viñuales “A Global Pact for the Environment: Conceptual Foundations” 2019(28) 
Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 3-12 at 9.  
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minimum standards, which – once codified – could present an obstacle to further specification 
and increased ambition.”65  
 
4.1. The Draft Global Pact 
The original text of the Global Pact was drafted by civil society actors and it must also be read 
and critiqued within this context.66 The Group of Experts was notably not constrained by the 
usual potentially inhibitive inter-State politics, exceptionalism and posturing; it could be as 
creative and ambitious as its wished to be and they could mention the “unmentionable gaps”. 
How ambitious has this Group of Experts managed to be in the draft text? To start with, the 
Pact’s preamble reads very much like any standard multilateral environmental agreement 
(MEA), although it does attempt to introduce the type of language that could be more explicitly 
associated with “unmentionable” ambitious norms. For example, the preamble mentions the 
World Charter for Nature, the need for ecosystem resilience, respect for the balance and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem, and the need to respect human rights obligations.  
More importantly, article 1 says: “Every person has the right to live in an ecologically sound 
environment adequate for their health, well-being, dignity, culture and fulfilment.”67 Despite 
the almost universal domestic emergence of environmental human rights the world over, (and 
in some countries the rights of nature),68 and apart from the Stockholm Declaration’s implicit 
hint at the existence of such a right,69 no IEL instrument, hard or soft, currently provides for an 
environmental right. This, despite high-level calls for its adoption in a global instrument.70 The 
inclusion of such a “constitutional” right in a binding global instrument will therefore not only 
fill a normative gap in IEL, it could also potentially raise that instrument’s level of normative 
force and status to that equalling a global “constitution”.71 This is further important because, 
although not nearly as normatively ambitious as a rights of nature clause, the Pact’s formulation 
deviates slightly, but in an important way, from standard versions of this right in that it also 
ambitiously recognises ecological soundness as a threshold for transgression, and not only 
human health and well-being.72  
Immediately following the environmental right clause, article 2 provides for a duty of care: 
“Every State or international institution, every person, natural or legal, public or private, has 
the duty to take care of the environment. To this end, everyone contributes at their own levels 
                                               
65 Christina Voigt “How a ‘Global Pact for the Environment’ could add Value to International Environmental 
Law” 2019(28) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 13-24 at 21. 
66 See, for the full text https://globalpactenvironment.org/uploads/EN.pdf.  
67 Own emphasis.  
68 Louis Kotzé and Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla “Somewhere between Rhetoric and Reality: Environmental 
Constitutionalism and the Rights of Nature in Ecuador” 2017 6(3) Transnational Environmental Law 401-433; 
Paola Villavicencio Calzadilla and Louis  Kotzé “Living in Harmony with Nature? A Critical Appraisal of the 
Rights of Mother Earth in Bolivia” 2018 7(3) Transnational Environmental Law 397-424.  
69 Principle 1.  
70 UN Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating 
to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment (24 January 2018) (A/HRC/37/59). Par 
46.  
71 Louis Kotzé Global Environmental Constitutionalism in the Anthropocene (Hart, 2016). 
72 See, generally James May and Erin Daly Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, 
2014. The environmental right provision is laudably bolstered by the trite procedural rights of access to 
information, public participation and access to environmental justice, which are regionally focused as a result of 
their inclusion in the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of 1998. Articles 9-11. 
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to the conservation, protection and restoration of the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem.”73 This 
is a provision one is more likely to encounter in domestic regimes and its inclusion here,74 
alongside the broadening of the scope of this duty to non-state actors and its reference to Earth 
system integrity, is both innovative, and I would suggest, ambitious. In fact, such a provision 
could also usefully form the basis of a norm holding corporations to account for socio-
ecological destruction.  
Articles 3-7 simply restate the well-known general principles of IEL including: integration and 
sustainable development, intergenerational equity (and strangely not also intra-generational or 
interspecies equity), prevention, precaution, remediation of environmental damages and 
polluter pays. A similar regurgitation occurs with respect to provisions on education and 
training, research and innovation, the role of non-state actors and subnational entities, 
cooperation, armed conflicts (from which provisions on ecocide are notably absent) and 
diversity of national situations.75 A plain reading of these principles and provisions suggests 
that they do not provide anything that could be considered more ambitious than what already 
exists.  
It is only towards the end of the draft text that there is again an attempt to be more ambitious. 
Article 15 states: “The Parties have the duty to adopt effective environmental laws, and to 
ensure their effective and fair implementation and enforcement.” Both in terms of the level and 
scope of obligation it requires and in terms of its purpose and possible practical implications, 
this is arguably one of the most ambitious norms of the draft text. Then follows a provision on 
resilience which provides “The Parties shall take necessary measures to maintain and restore 
the diversity and capacity of ecosystems and human communities to withstand environmental 
disruptions and degradation and to recover and adapt.” This is an equally ambitious principle 
that more fully responds to the emerging field of resilience-thinking, and that innovatively 
seeks to incorporate the duty to ensure resilience into the broader corpus of IEL.76 While a 
strong case could be made out in support of an argument that IEL must not only halt socio-
ecological decay, but also more ambitiously improve Earth system stability and integrity and 
promote restoration, article 17 at least provides for the principle of non-regression: “The Parties 
and their sub-national entities [must] refrain from allowing activities or adopting norms that 
have the effect of reducing the global level of environmental protection guaranteed by current 
law.”  
On balance then, the extent to which the draft Global Pact’s pursues normative ambition is a 
mixed bag. In some instances it innovatively offers ambitious norms that have not yet been 
taken up in the current body of IEL, and this is encouraging. But in other instances it simply 
restates several existing norms which cannot by any measure be said to be ambitious. It has 
shied away, for example, from being overtly “ecological” by shunning provisions such as the 
rights of nature, the principles of in dubio pro natura and inter-species justice.  
 
4.2. The gap report 
                                               
73 Own emphasis.  
74 See, for example, section 28 of South Africa’s National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998.  
75 Articles 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 and 20.  
76 Jonas Ebbesson and Ellen Hey “Where in Law is Social-Ecological Resilience?” 2013 18(3) Ecology and 
Society 25-28.  
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For its part, the gap report confirms much that we already know, namely that there are, 
… significant gaps and deficiencies with respect to the applicable principles of environmental 
law; the normative and institutional content of the sectoral regulatory regimes, as well as their 
articulation with environment-related regimes; the governance structure of international 
environmental law; and the effective implementation of, compliance with and enforcement of 
international environmental law.77 
 
More specifically, restating also those featuring in the draft Global Pact, the report first 
evaluates all the existing principles of IEL.78 More promisingly, it recognises that the “right to 
a clean and healthy environment” is not part of IEL law yet, and that “international treaties 
have not defined the threshold below which the level of environmental quality must fall before 
a breach of a person´s human rights has occurred.”79 While the draft Global Pact uses the much 
more ambitiously formulated “ecological soundness” as a threshold, the gap report’s threshold 
is considerably less ambitious as evidenced by its use of “clean and healthy environment”. The 
report also steers well clear of identifying rights of nature as a possible gap. What will certainly 
qualify as an “unmentionable” gap, and going considerably further than the draft Global Pact, 
is the principle of non-regression and progression: “Non-regression aims at ensuring that 
environmental protection is not weakened, while progression aims at the improvement of 
environmental legislation, including by increasing the level of protection, on the basis of the 
most recent scientific knowledge.”80  
Moving from the principles of IEL to the gaps relating to existing regulatory regimes,81 the gap 
report recognises that: “The challenge is to encourage the participation of all relevant actors 
while at the same time ensuring that the commitments are ambitious enough to provide for an 
effective response to the problem, and to ensure that parties comply with their obligations.”82 
It says, with specific reference to the existing climate regime, that “the current nationally 
determined contributions are so far not sufficiently ambitious, and if they are not increased 
they will not lead to the realization of the global temperature goal.”83 This is an important 
recognition of the need to create ambitious norms that could essentially restrict carbon-
intensive economic activities for the benefit of addressing climate change. Having said that, 
unlike the draft Global Pact’s ambitious provision on the duty of care, the report then says 
nothing about the “unmentionable” and deeply troubling gap in IEL to hold liable and 
accountable non-state actors, such as corporations, that contribute to climate change. 
Moreover, nothing in the remainder of this part of the report that includes protection of the 
atmosphere, conservation of biodiversity and protection of soils, protection of freshwater 
resources, protection of oceans and seas and the regulation of hazardous substances and 
activities, identifies any “unmentionable” gaps.  
Part IV of the report deals with gaps in environment-related instruments, including those 
related to trade, investment, intellectual property and human rights. Again, no mention is made 
of “unmentionable” gaps. Although admittedly less relevant for the type of “unmentionable” 
gaps and norms that are addressed in this paper, the same is also true for Part V that deals with 
                                               
77 UNGA “Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-related Instruments: Towards a Global 
Pact for the Environment” UN Doc A/73/419 (30 November 2018).  
78 Part II.  
79 At par 18.  
80 At par 22.  
81 Part III.  
82 At par 23. Own emphasis.  
83 At par 28.  
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gaps relating to the governance structure of IEL and for Part IV that surveys gaps in the 
implementation and effectiveness of IEL. There is no reference, for example, to concerns 
surrounding the lack of a more centralised and powerful UN environmental governance body. 
And while the fragmentation of IEL is a recurring theme in this part, it is not discussed in the 
context of a lack of an Earth system approach, or being the result of the absence of a unifying 
ecological Grundnorm such as Earth system integrity, as some believe it is.84  
In sum, the report does not expressly or comprehensively address the issue of lack of normative 
ambition, suggesting perhaps that it does not consider the lack of ambitious norms to be a gap 
in the strict sense of the word. And with one or two exceptions, nor does it attempt to identify 
alternative and potentially more ambitious “unmentionable” norms that IEL should ideally 
provide for. On balance, the report ultimately seems to be less focused on the content of norms 
and their level of ambition than it is on the processes and structures of IEL and its 
implementation. In the words of one of the co-drafters of the report, “‘Gaps’ in their most 
obvious meaning, for instance lacunae or unregulated environmental issues, are covered to a 
disappointingly limited extent.” 85  
Without having had the benefit of scrutinizing the gap report which was published several 
weeks after we explored IEL’s “factual, technical and (unmentionable) normative gaps”, 
French and I asked at that stage: 
Will the gap report, as an important potential initiator of such a reform process [of IEL], 
mention the ‘unmentionable gaps’? … We remain sceptical and are concerned that the gap 
report will indeed be suitable reading to be left around the home for all (States) to read – 
precisely because it says very little that is radical and shocking, new or groundbreaking.86 
Regrettably, our suspicions have been confirmed; the report mentions many gaps, all of them 
relevant and worthy of consideration by the ad hoc working group, but it mentions very few 
“unmentionable” gaps or ways to respond to these.  
Some might argue that a consideration of such unmentionable gaps as part of the gap analysis 
was never part of the Secretary-General’s mandate. But one could counter that the wording of 
the mandate (“possible gaps in international environmental law and environment-related 
instruments”)87 is sufficiently broad to also include lack of normative ambition and IEL’s 
“unmentionable” gaps. Moreover, the report itself confirms that its scope of inquiry was broad 
enough to focus on both “regulatory gaps” and “governance gaps” which mean respectively 
“substantive/normative (including procedural and institutional) gaps and implementation gaps 
in the international legal framework.”88 Fortunately, the ad hoc working group’s consideration 
of the “possible gaps in international law” is not restricted to possible gaps in the Secretary-
                                               
84 Rakhyun Kim and Klaus Bosselmann “International Environmental Law in the Anthropocene: Towards a 
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General’s report.89 This means that “unmentionable” gaps could still be explored by the 
working group in the coming months and be included as part of its recommendations to the 
UNGA; a possibility that must certainly be encouraged.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The Global Pact initiative offers a timely and critically important opportunity to improve the 
ways in which we respond juridically to an increasingly erratic Earth system and how we 
address the underlying drivers that cause, exacerbate and perpetuate the Anthropocene. I 
believe the Pact’s value lies specifically in how it admirably manages to raise awareness of 
global socio-ecological decline; how it attempts to seek broader consensus among the public, 
the scientific community, and (hopefully also) among States that something needs to be done 
soon; and for the momentum it is creating that could possibly culminate in the type of “global 
environmental constitutional moment”90 that the Anthropocene ultimately demands. The 
numerous benefits of the Global Pact initiative are obvious, and even if it only gets us talking 
again about the deficiencies of IEL and finding ways to address these deficiencies, it would 
already have been worth the many laborious efforts pursued by its proponents.  
In theory at least, the Global Pact initiative could do many things, including to increase IEL’s 
normative ambition. And if it does, “[S]tates should take advantage of this opportunity to 
consider the issues systematically and non‐politically, in the hopes of focusing global effort on 
key areas in need of strengthened international attention.”91 Looking to the future, and 
remaining consistent with past State practice, States might very well deliberately shy away 
from including ambitious norms in a globally binding instrument. But I suspect that this time 
round it might be slightly more complicated for States to do so and to justify their (in)actions 
in any plausible way considering that the socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene  has now 
become a prominent aspect of peoples’ lived realities and of the public discourse (especially in 
terms of climate change). This, in turn, could raise the pressure on States to act more 
deliberately. The Global Pact initiative has also already garnered considerable support in the 
public, scientific and even State domains, which places additional pressure on States to be more 
readily receptive to instigating reforms of IEL. Collectively this challenges the status quo, 
namely, that reforming international (environmental) law has historically been, and will 
continue to be, a protracted process where incremental, politically acceptable, and therefore 
reforms with unambitious results, are the order of the day. 
More importantly, however, and looking to the present, what happens now will inevitably 
shape the future trajectory of the Global Pact initiative, including the design, objectives, scope 
and normative ambition of a globally binding instrument (if this option remains on the table). 
Considering the contentious nature of the issue of normative ambition in international 
(environmental) law, if the Global Pact initiative does not already now endorse the type of 
norms to address IEL’s “unmentionable” gaps, it is highly unlikely that it will do so in future. 
While we have praised the collective initiative behind the Global Pact, the momentum it creates 
for change and the hope it offers for much needed structural reform of IEL, French and I have 
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cautioned that it would be “retrogressive to entrench an inadequate document which fails to 
reflect the imperative of new law, or Lex Anthropocenae”.92 We have similarly raised concerns 
about the type of gaps its gap report might concern itself with, including possible ways to “fill” 
these gaps.93 Our concerns have been shared by others.94 Regrettably, these concerns remain. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that while there are some innovative and normatively 
ambitions provisions in the draft text of the Pact, it cannot be labelled an ambitious ecological 
instrument in any overt sense. Neither is the gaps analysis predominantly geared towards 
raising the level of IEL’s normative ambition by addressing ways in which to fill 
“unmentionable” gaps.  
The Global Pact initiative is currently riding an unprecedented wave of optimism, which is 
obviously encouraging and well worth of further encouragement. But going forward, it would 
be important not to be placated by any false sense of security that such optimism and a business-
as-usual approach to shaping this initiative might create. If the intention is for the Global Pact 
to “only” serve as a binding “overarching statement of principles”,95 and thus to be less 
concerned about IEL’s substance while it unambitiously maintains the normative status quo, 
then we need not take the debate on normative ambition any further in the context of the Pact. 
But then we would also need to be comfortable with the fact (and accept the responsibilities 
that will come with such a decision) that we are merely preserving, what Brooks calls, the 
“relative stability of the traditional legal regime”; a regime that in turn provides a “legitimate 
agenda for conventional legal scholarship … [which] will treat the traditional environmental 
law regime as a machine designed to achieve laudable purposes, but needing a squirt of oil here 
or a new ball bearing there.”96 The Anthropocene tells us that IEL requires a complete overhaul, 
not merely tinkering at the margins.  
In a comprehensive assessment of law’s involvement with the processes that cause the 
Anthropocene, Viñuales recently argued: 
…there is a tendency to assume that the role of law is to tackle the negative externalities of 
transactions (e.g. their environmental or social implications) rather than the core of the 
underlying transactions (i.e. the organisation of production and consumption processes). Such 
focus on externalities fails, in my view, to unveil the role of law in prompting, sustaining and 
potentially managing the processes that have led to the Anthropocene.97 
I entirely agree that IEL cannot convincingly ignore or deny its entanglement with the rise of 
Anthropos, its mastery of the Earth system, and the unjust socio-ecological order that results 
therefrom. IEL has been and continues to be complicit in causing, sustaining and exacerbating 
the Anthropocene’s socio-ecological crisis, if not always explicitly, then certainly in subtle, 
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but no less effective and disturbing ways.98 And while it is arguably far easier for IEL to address 
negative externalities such as pollution, it is manifestly more challenging for it to drive the type 
of structural changes necessary to avoid these externalities in the first place. The three examples 
I have offered in Part 2 above are cases in point. To this end, the more pertinent question that 
arises when reflecting on the “task of law in the Anthropocene”, as Viñuales says, “is not 
merely whether existing legal concepts can be extended and adjusted to reflect the new human 
condition but, more generally, whether new legal ontologies must be developed that are 
specifically (not just tangentially) concerned with the geological implications of human 
powers.”99 Ambitious “unmentionable” norms arguably could go a long way to foster such new 
legal ontologies that more accurately and fully reflect augmented human responsibility. In so 
doing, ambitious norms could at once contribute to confront head on IEL’s structural 
complicity in enabling the Anthropocene’s drivers, with the ultimate view to eventually 
inaugurating a new legal paradigm more fit for purpose in the Anthropocene.   
If the Global Pact initiative also endeavors to be part of such a confrontation by raising the 
level of IEL’s normative ambition (and I believe it should be), then it will have to be much 
more attentive to embracing the type of ambitious “unmentionable” norms that IEL has hitherto 
shied away from. The Global Pact and everyone involved with promoting it will have to 
become much more “hostile” to the status quo, despite, or hopefully even consequent on, 
sustained radical critique that is aimed at bolstering this important initiative.  
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